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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper we employ a philosophical-historical approach 
toward understanding (Library and) Information Science as both a 
social and a technological science. We do this, via Martin 
Heidegger’s works, by returning to the etymological roots of 
technique and technology, the Ancient Greek term techne, and 
through this we see how this term has been diametrically 
characterized in the Western philosophical tradition. We propose 
an account of socio-technical and technological causality that 
explains (L)IS technical and technological research in terms of 
cultural-social, as well as material and professional, affordances, 
rather than as determinative causation.  Our argument aims not 
only to contribute an understanding of the role of social and 
technological research in the field, but also to begin a critique of 
some quantitative and qualitative research in the field. 
 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
K.7.0 [The Computing Profession]: General. 
General Terms 
Documentation, Standardization, Languages, Theory 
Keywords 
Information Research, Critical Information Theory, Social 
Informatics, Technology, Affordances 
1. INTRODUCTION 
It is well-known that there is a wide spectrum of what can be 
characterized as ‘information research.’ In the field of (Library 
and) Information Science ((L)IS) there are such research areas as 
user studies, information behavior, information architecture, 
information representation and organization, information 
retrieval, and so on. Information research has also been 
undertaken by scholars in the social studies of science and 
technology, particularly in the area of information infrastructure 
(for example, Bowker and Star 2000; Bowker, 2005) and artificial 
intelligence, such as medical informatics (for example, Forsythe 
2001). More recently, there has been concern about the social 
importance of information research, and as a result, the 
emergence of the research area of social informatics. But, what is 
the relationship between information research and the ‘social’? 
And, how is the ‘social’ important for information research? 
2. INFORMATION AND TECHNOLOGY 
Information research, by its very name, sounds to be engaged in 
research about information. Consequently, it is natural that much 
of the conceptual and critical work in information research during 
the past thirty or so years has focused on definitions of 
information and information science (for example, Bates 1999, 
2005, 2006; Brookes 1980; Buckland 1991; Hjørland 2006; 
Saracevic 1991, 1999). The discussion of the concept of 
information is very important—for an articulation of the 
epistemological and ontological assumptions of the concept of 
information would explicate how the concept has informed 
information research, and an analysis of the uses of the word 
“information” would show how it has shaped a certain kind of 
thinking and ideology in our day-to-day activities and in our 
professional activities as information professionals and 
information researchers (see, for example, Day 2001; Frohmann 
2004). 
 
Most of the research in (L)IS, however, is not purely conceptual 
and it is usually not critical.  Rather, it involves the study of the 
use and/or efficiency of various types of information and of 
information technology. For example, information architecture is 
concerned with the design of information infrastructure, with this 
latter term meaning entities such as web pages and databases; 
information representation and organization are concerned with 
how data are represented and organized in a systematic way for 
computerized systems; information retrieval is concerned with 
devising algorithms for the successful retrieval of information. In 
other words, most of information research is not an analysis of 
information as a term, but rather, it is an analysis of different 
things called “information” in their design, configuration and use, 
often involving technologies that are then referred to as 
‘information technologies.’ As such, information research is often 
seen in terms of ‘user’ research into information problem solving, 
particularly, problem solving in different social spaces: 
organizations, public spaces, virtual spaces, schools, etc.  In turn, 
however, information research also involves problem solving in 
designing and troubleshooting technological systems that aid the 
problem solving of users. Thus, technological problem solving in 
information science doesn’t just involve engineering skills in 
system building and troubleshooting, but it tends to begin and end 
with the problems that users and producers encounter.  
 
Can we conceive of a manner of conceptually analyzing these two 
aspects of information science ‘empirical’ research?  If we could 
we would be opening up a conceptual ‘meta-theoretical’ avenue 
other than that of a critique of the obfuscation and reification of 
the term ‘information’ in the midst of a plethora of its social and 
professional deployments. 
 
We would like to open up such an analysis by explicating the 
‘social’ in terms other than that of determinative causality 
between ‘users’ and ‘technology,’ and, ‘technology’ and ‘users.’ 
We seek an analysis that can provide a unitary framework for 
analyzing both ‘social’ and ‘technological’ research in 
information science. Given that social analysis is often viewed in 
causal terms borrowed from physics—that is, causation 
understood as the determinate force exerted by one body upon 
another, and as such, ‘users’ making use of technologies to 
‘effect’ resulting products, technology’s ‘effects’ upon society, 
and so forth—is there a way of rethinking social causation in 
other terms than causes and effects? Such an analysis would, as 
well, give us a different interpretation of social informatics than 
has been the traditional understanding and it would open social 
informatics to new (and to previous, akin) research projects. It 
would inject more a form of cultural analysis into analyzing 
‘social situations.’ Together, cultural forms and social situations 
form two durational axes—a long duration (tradition) and a short 
duration (site specificity)—that are necessary for considering 
meaningful action.  (We here include Harré’s (2004) third axis of 
indexicality as a combination of the two previous in moments of 
radical temporality governed by, on the one hand, necessity, and 
on the other hand, choice.) Social Informatics is doomed if it 
treats actors as mere determinate causes or effects of ‘technology’ 
or ‘information’ without accounting for the intentionality of the 
actors and the affordances for their expressive production.   
 
In the following we offer a starting point for rethinking the social 
in relation to techniques and to technologies.  We do so from the 
viewpoint of rethinking social causation according to what 
Aristotle termed “formal” causation, rather than according to the 
“efficient” causation that we discussed above, as the norm for 
social analysis. In this manner, we will also be asking that social 
research take into greater account those practices of cultural 
research approaches, namely, those that stress forms or 
“affordances” for expression and emergence.  We wish to 
emphasize rethinking the techne of (Library and) Information 
Science according to their affordances. 
  
In this paper, we will begin such an analysis through a reading of 
the beginning of the German philosopher, Martin Heidegger’s, 
1953 article, “The Question Concerning Technology” [1977b]. 
Heidegger’s analysis offers an understanding of technique and 
technology as emergences and expressions indebted to four types 
of affordances. Whatever the limitations of Heidegger’s account 
may be, it does provide a substantial, historically grounded 
account of the cultural meaning of technology over a long 
duration, and, thus, provides a useful and rare account of the role 
of cultural meaning in our understanding of human and 
technological interaction and co-development.  
3. TECHNE 
The relation between ‘technique’ and ‘technology’ warrants our 
consideration, not the least because in many modern Western 
European languages the difference between these two terms is not 
as strong as in English, deviating less from the original Ancient 
Greek term, techne, which etymologically unites the two former 
terms.  “Techne” in the Ancient Greek means an art or craft 
whereby something emerges into appearance (poiesis). Thus, 
from the perspective of Ancient Greek philosophy up through the 
use of many modern Western European languages, in speaking 
about any production we must start with the relation of techne to 
creation. 
 
In his lecture and then essay, “The Question Concerning 
Technology” [1977b], Heidegger discusses techne’s role in 
expression and production, and he does so by examining the 
philosophically and culturally important Aristotelian discussion of 
the four types of causality (the first or formal, the material, the 
efficient, and the final causes) in Aristotle’s Physics. In 
Heidegger’s essay [1977b], Aristotle’s four causes are 
reinterpreted from their understanding in Latin and modern 
philosophy as causa back to what Heidegger claims is their 
proper understanding in Ancient Greek philosophy, understood in 
terms of the Greek, aition. Heidegger reads aition in terms of 
indebtedness. This reading goes against the grain of the 
philosophical tradition since, at least, the period of Latin 
philosophy. It is a reading that reinterprets Aristotle’s four causes 
and the meaning of techne and poiesis according to the four 
causes’ interdependences on one another.  It also stresses the 
causes as mutually important, co-responsible affordances to 
which the emergent thing is indebted.  This reading stands in 
contrast to the traditional deterministic and teleological reading of 
the four causes (where an ideal “first cause” is understood as an 
origin that is fulfilled in the final product (the “final cause”), vis-
à-vis efficient and material causes, with each cause being read as 
a determinate force; hence, with the efficient cause—understood 
as determinate force—being understood as the dominant 
characteristic cause throughout the teleological chain of 
causation.)   
 
In the Latin tradition, Aristotle’s four causes are read as 
teleological and determinative of each upon the other as a 
sequence of events. Such a reading would yield, for example, the 
following analysis of creation or production (to use an easy-to-
understand example): the blueprint for a house (first or formal 
cause: an originary form or idea to be completed in an 
actualization), the material causes (bricks, plumbing, etc.), the 
efficient cause (labor), and the final ‘cause’ or result (the actual 
house itself as an actual fulfillment of the original idea). In 
contrast, according to Heidegger’s [1977b] rereading of causa by 
aition, the four causes are read as follows: Aristotle’s “first” or 
“formal” cause is understood as the cultural ‘context’ or forms, 
social situation and needs, and the resulting plan for what is to be 
created; the efficient cause is understood as the craftsperson or 
other human agency for bringing about the object; the material 
cause is understood as the matter that makes up the object; and 
the final cause is understood as the reception and purpose for 
which the thing is brought forward. Together, these are 
understood as a total assemblage of socio-cultural, material, and 
labor affordances that allow an object to emerge. Such an object 
is the product of a craft or art (techne), which is the human 
manner of bringing things forth (poiesis). The object is indebted 
to these affordances for its emergence. It is an expression through 
these affordances.   
The pivotal point in this argument is that Aristotle’s first cause is 
reread by Heidegger as meaning forms for emergence and 
expression—affordances—rather than being an ideal blueprint for 
an actual product, as in the Platonic tradition or, equally, in the 
Latin tradition. This rereading of the first cause also permeates 
Heidegger’s rereading of all the other causes, that is, his reading 
of them as different types of affordances.  Determinate causes are 
replaced by a notion of cause as affordance. Affordances are 
forms that the object is indebted to for emerging as a certain type 
of thing—with material properties, social intentions, cultural 
expressions, and a site-specificity and time-value to its production 
and use.  Heidegger’s analysis reinserts situated action into 
production.  He returns historicity—and, consequently, historical 
analysis—to the produced object.  But a reread notion of “formal 
causes”—that is, as affordances—allows situated action to be 
understood in a non-mentalistic manner. 
It should be mentioned that one of the consequences of 
Heidegger’s interpretation is that content-container metaphors 
that function in the idealist Latin understanding of the four 
causes—that is, the four causes as the teleological realization of a 
‘first,’ ideal essence contained in a representation—are left 
behind. Textual or other representations, instead of “containing” a 
‘theoretical’ idea that is then realized in ‘practice,’ are viewed as 
cultural forms for expression, themselves being forms of practice. 
In Heidegger’s analysis, there is no “epistemic content” 
[Frohmann 2004] in formal plans, which is then realized in an 
object.  
It would be taking us a bit afield and would require too in-depth 
an analysis for this paper to retrace the important relationships 
between our modern understandings of art and other types of 
works and techne in Heidegger’s oeuvre [for this, see Day 2008]. 
What is necessary, here, however, is to recognize what is most at 
stake for our present topic in Heidegger’s reinterpretation of the 
four causes: 1) production is re-understood culturally-socially, 
and 2) social events are understood in terms of mutual 
affordances, rather than as determinate forces or causes of agents 
acting upon one another and upon objects or vice versa. This 
affects modern technological and technical studies in that techne 
is understood to underlie both.  Both technique and technology in 
(L)IS are cultural-social in nature, being made up of actions and 
parts arranged and used for producing meaningful acts and 
products. For Heidegger, technological modernity is characterized 
as the metaphysical understanding of creation as determinative 
and teleological, leading from ideal frames for knowledge and 
object production to the realization of those ‘theories’ in actual 
‘practices’ and ‘products.’  It is a production that privileges an 
ideal and reproducible production over a site-specific and time-
valued, self-reflective, historical praxis. 
The result of this critique is strongly felt in a very late essay, “The 
End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking” [Heidegger 1977a], 
where Heidegger contrasts this analysis of techne against what he 
terms, “the thesis of the precedence of method,” a phrase that he 
uses to characterize the nature of modern research, as well as 
modern life dominated by scientific-technological production. 
The “thesis of the precedence of method,” for Heidegger, is the 
modern assumption that method assures an ‘objective’ and 
reproducible ‘truth’ in research, just as technological production 
assures the reproducible certainty of the object’s production. 
Social research and technological production proceed by 
establishing frames for research and production and attaining 
products based on strict methods. Those methods may involve 
material or semiotic tools of any sort.  What is not as of much 
importance in modern research and technological production is 
the critical evaluation of the relation of production to its 
affordances or a cultural understanding of the affordances 
themselves.  
For Heidegger, the mistaken importance of modern research is 
that of the precedence of method as an assurance for rigor and 
reproducibility in its research production. In turn, such methods 
themselves must be rigorous and reproducible. Standardization is 
thus assured, even if this means turning the cultural affordances of 
things and events into causa for attaining results in research or 
technological production. Often, social science research involves 
treating meaning as quantifiable and attributing determinate 
causes (physiological or social) to intentions (see not only 
Heidegger’s work, but with a much clearer epistemological focus, 
Rom Harré’s work as well (for example, Harré, 2004)). For 
Heidegger, in fact, all of modernity, including modern research, is 
involved in modern technological production, in the sense that it 
is involved in the production of products that rigorously and 
consistently follow from the guiding frames of theoretical 
‘blueprints.’ What is lacking, Heidegger is arguing, is an 
awareness of the cultural affordances that underlie this, including 
the cultural metaphysics that reach from the Latin period through 
modernity.  The Latin rereading of aition by causa must, for 
Heidegger, be seen as cultural affordances that allow the 
metaphysical tradition to emerge and embed itself in our 
understandings of technique and technology. Philosophical 
metaphysics is, thus, only one—though a condensed and thus 
exemplary substantiation—of what we might call a “cultural 
metaphysics.” 
Studies of the concept of information in (L)IS often begin with 
different ontologies of information—following from the different 
senses given to the word “information” in ordinary and/or (L)IS 
discourses—and then they proceed to show how these different 
ontologies or senses of “information” cannot be unified, but are 
supported by different research “approaches.”  Such research has 
difficulty linking ontological critique to epistemological critique. 
In the sciences, “approaches” are called “methods,” and they tend 
toward internal consistency and rigor, as well as—sometimes and 
ideally (depending on the discipline—a priori or a posteriori)—
toward external consistency and rigor in application. From the 
perspective of Heidegger’s analysis, at the least, it may be more 
beneficial to view ontologies of information as arising from 
methods and epistemologies within the sciences, as well as from a 
broader range of discourses in popular culture. Ontological 
critique follows from an epistemological critique of the 
‘approaches’ adopted.  
 
We would be amiss, however, not to point to a recent 
expressionist and emergence tradition in information research 
wherein affordances are accounted for, even if the full 
consequences for the social science tradition, and, possibly, the 
technological traditions, in (L)IS are not fully acknowledged. This 
is a view of the social sciences that sees social research as 
qualitative and ethnographic (we recognize some of this occurring 
very lately in ‘information behavior’ research, particularly in its 
constructionist occurrences, and in the theorization of ‘positioning 
theory’ [Given, 2005]). Here, agents, materials, and objects are 
seen as forms for expression and emergence. In LIS, however, we 
have also seen some poor and misleading examples of 
ethnographic research, with the old specters of universalist claims 
and determinative causality haunting qualitative research, as 
much as it did previous quantitative research.  
Further, what has been lacking in (L)IS research as a whole has 
been the awareness that critical conceptual research in (L)IS has 
been, essentially, the forcing of a cultural-historical mode of 
analysis back onto the term “information” itself as well as other 
foundational terms and concepts in the field.. Such a 
misunderstanding has, perhaps, occurred because some of the 
conceptual studies in (L)IS are not nothing other than attempts to 
provide (L)IS with some sort of ‘philosophical’ or academic 
‘foundations.’ These latter attempts are done for political or 
sociological reasons, not for philosophical ones, for the functions 
of philosophy in regard to (L)IS are to clear up conceptual 
confusions and/or to create concepts that aid in our understanding 
of what such a field may and may not be or what the term 
“information” can or cannot mean, socially, culturally, and 
professionally.  
4. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we employ a philosophical-historical approach 
toward understanding (Library and) Information Science as both a 
social and a technological science. We have done this, via Martin 
Heidegger’s works, by returning to the etymological roots of 
technique and technology, the Ancient Greek techne, and we have 
seen how this term has been diametrically characterized in the 
Western philosophical tradition. We have proposed an account of 
socio-technical and technological causality that explains (L)IS 
technical and technological research in terms of cultural-social, as 
well as material and professional, affordances, rather than as 
determinative causation.  
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